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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the 
study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in Western 
nations without states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in 
the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's dictatorship 
(1939-1975).  
The paper is divided into three parts. To begin with, the first part 
sets up a theoretical framework which includes a definition of the concepts 
of nation, state and nationalism and also introduces the concept f nations 
without states. It then establishes a distinction between “state nationalism” 
and nationalism in “nations without states”. The second part analyses the 
relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in the work of Elie 
Kedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith. The third part 
considers the specific context within which intellectuals operate in nations 
without states. It concentrates on the study of the role of Catalan 
intellectuals in protecting their vernacular language and culture during 
Franco's regime together with the processes which, in the 1960s and 
1970s, turned Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement. 
Particular attention is given to the cultural resistance activities carried out 
by Catalan intellectuals during this period, the reasons why some 
intellectuals may feel attracted to nationalism, and the rational and 
emotional arguments employed by intellectuals as mobilizing agents.  
Part One 
Introduction: What are nations without states? 
A basic conceptual distinction between nation, state and 
nationalism has to be made. By “state”, taking Weber's definition, I refer to 
“a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991, p. 
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78), although not all states have successfully accomplished this, and some 
of them have not even aspired to accomplish it. By “nation” I refer to a 
human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common 
culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past 
and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. 
Thus, in my view, the “nation” includes five dimensions: psychological 
(consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and 
historical. By offering this definition, I distinguish the term nation from both 
the state and the nation-state, and I shall be using this distinction later 
when considering what I call “nations without states”. By “nationalism” I 
mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify 
with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide 
upon their common political destiny.  
But still another term needs to be defined and distinguished from 
the ones I have just mentioned: the nation-state. The nation-state is a 
modern phenomenon which emerged around the French Revolution in the 
late eighteenth century. Its characterised by the formation of a kind of state 
which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force 
within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subjected to its 
rule by means of homogenisation, creating a common culture, symbols, 
values, reviving traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing 
them.  
The distinctive character of this paper derives from its aim to 
provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between 
intellectuals and nationalism in “nations without states”. By “nations without 
states” I refer to nations which, in spite of having their territories included 
within the boundaries of one or more states maintain a separate sense of 
national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, 
attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves 
(Guibernau, 1999). At present, most thriving nationalist movements in 
Western nations without states emerge within nations which once enjoyed 
a separate political and/or cultural identity which is now being invoked, 
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revitalized and adapted to the new socio-political circumstances in which 
the nation lives and evolves 
Self-determination is sometimes understood as political autonomy, 
in other cases it stops short of independence and often involves the right to 
secede. Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flanders 
represent but a few nations without states currently demanding further 
autonomy. It could be argued that some of these nations already have 
some kind of state of their own since a substantial number of powers have 
been devolved to their regional parliaments. But political autonomy or 
even federation differ substantially from independence since they tend to 
exclude foreign and economic policy, defence and constitutional matters, 
and this is why it continues to make sense to refer to them as “nations 
without states”.  
I argue that a specific distinction between “state nationalism” and 
nationalism in “nations without states” is necessary in order to understand 
some of the key specific features of nationalism in both cases. It should be 
stressed that what distinguishes both types of nationalism has nothing to 
do with issuing a value judgement and claiming that one type of 
nationalism is “good” while the other is “bad, one is “ethnic” and the other 
“civic”. Rather the two fundamental differences between “state nationlism” 
and nationalism in “nations without states” concern their different access to 
power and resources, and the fact that while the former seeks to 
consolidate and strengthen the state, the latter challenges its legitimacy 
and often, but not always, seeks to construct a new state. 
When considering the relationship between intellectuals and 
nationalism, I shall be following Smith's definition of intellectuals as those 
who create artistic works and produce ideas. In so doing I distinguishing 
them from the “wider intelligentsia or professionals who transmit and 
disseminate those ideas and creations and form a still wider educated 
public that ‘consumes’ ideas and works of art” (Smith 1991, p. 93), 
although in practice, the same individual may fulfil all these different roles.  
Before turning to the specific study of the task of intellectuals in 
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nations without states, this paper reviews the theories of Kedourie, Nairn, 
Breuilly and Smith since they all have devoted some sections of their work 
to the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and intellectuals. 
But it should be stressed that their theories do not address the specific role 
of intellectuals in nations without states. On the contrary, they neglect the 
need to establish a clear-cut distinction between those intellectuals 
operating within the nation-state and contributing to create “state 
nationalism”, and those evolving within nations lacking a state of their own. 
An exception to this is represented by Kedourie's analysis of intellectuals in 
colonial societies. 
Part Two 
Intellectuals and nationalism 
Elie Kedourie: On “marginal men” 
“ ... I began to rebel against the glory I could not be associated with”  
(Quoted by Kedourie in Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p. 88)  
 
Kedourie sustains an hostile attitude towards nationalism and 
defines it as a sort of politics which is not concerned with reality, rather “its 
solitary object is an inner world and its end is the abolition of all politics” 
(Kedourie 1986, p. 85). He sees nationalism as a disease which originated 
in the West and then spread to other parts of the world. In his view, 
intellectuals are to be blamed for the generation of a doctrine based on the 
assumption that nations are obvious and natural divisions of the human 
race as history, anthropology and linguistics prove.  
According to Kedourie, alienated and restless intellectuals 
marginalized from politics under the impact of Enlightenment rationalism 
turned to Romanticism and generated nationalism as a doctrine that would 
have the capacity to grant them a major role within society1. He is 
extremely critical of Romantic intellectuals such as Herder or Fichte and 
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fully identifies nationalism with Romanticism. 
Kedourie focuses on the role of intellectuals in colonial societies. 
He describes how some Western educated indigenous people became 
completely alienated from their traditional societies and identified with the 
culture and manners of the colonizers only to discover that indigenous 
elites were excluded from positions of honour and responsibility reserved 
for the white colonizers. He writes, 
an Indian could be admitted to the civil service only if he had 
become so completely Europeanized as to be really and practically 
on the footing and imbued with the character of an English highly 
educated gentleman. But it did not prove to be the case that an 
Indian who had become “imbued” with such a character would be 
easily or automatically treated like an English gentleman (Kedourie 
1971, p. 84). 
In fact, what Kedourie writes about indigenous elites in colonial 
societies is highly relevant to the analysis of some indigenous elites in 
nations without states, specially where some specific regional affiliation 
acts as a barrier for promotion within the state's socio-political and 
economic structure.  
One of the main objections to Kedourie's theory is that it fails to 
account for the nationalism defended and generated by “official” 
intellectuals who already have secured honour and status within the state. 
In doing so he ignores the nationalism espoused by the colonizers which 
included their own intellectuals and political leaders. It could be argued that 
the colonizers' nationalism was to be blamed for the exclusion experienced 
by indigenous elites who, in spite of being culturally homogenized and 
integrated, wer  never viewed as “belonging” to the colonizer's nation.
Kedourie's theory presumes a wide gap between active intellectual 
elites and inert and disoriented masses. In his view, the only way to 
persuade the people to support the nationalist movement is through 
propaganda an control over education. To mobilize the people, elites must 
“appeal to the indigenous beliefs and practices, invoke the dark gods and 
their rites, and transform purely religious motifs and figures into political 
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and national symbols and heroes –which is all part of the ‘ethnicization’ 
and nationalization of previously universal and transhistorical religions” 
(Smith 1998, p. 113). 
Kedourie concedes that an elite of intellectuals captures the main 
injustices endured by the mass of the population and constructs a 
nationalist doctrine whose aim is to eliminate the unjust situation shared by 
all those belonging to the same nation, thus uniting elites and masses 
under a single banner. But, for him, the objective of these fanatical 
intellectuals goes well beyond the wish to end the unjust situation that their 
fellow country men and women are enduring. The intellectuals' objective is 
to gain power in society and halt their alienation and exclusion from 
positions of honour and privilege.  
 
Tom Nairn: The people's mobilizers 
“The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the 
masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language 
they understood” 
(The Break-Up of Britain, p. 340) 
 
Nairn approaches the study of nationalism from a Marxist 
perspective. He considers nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon which 
can be derived from the class consequences of the uneven diffusion of 
capitalism (Nairn 1977, p. 98-99). Nationalism generates and, at the same 
time, requires the exploitation of peripheries whose deprived elites have no 
alternative but to turn to the masses and engage them in the nationalist 
project. In this context, nationalism's main objective is to fight against a 
concrete form of “progress” promoted by the colonial capitalist while at the 
same time embracing a distinctive idea of progress generated by the 
intellectuals capable of leading their struggle against capitalist oppression 
(Nairn 1977, p. 339). 
Nairn explains the emergence of nationalism in deprived a eas as 
a reaction against the uneven spread of capitalism. But he also 
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acknowledges the existence of some exceptions to the connection he 
establishes between nationalism, backwardness and periphery.  
To mobilize the masses and gain their support for the na ionalist 
cause, the new intellectual elites have to work towards the construction of 
a “militant inter-class community” sharing a common identity even if, as 
Nairn stresses, they only share this identity in a mythical way. 
Nairn, as well as Hroch and Peter Worsley, envisages a 
chronological progression in the spread of nationalism from elite into mass 
involvement. 
In Nairn's theory, the support of the masses is crucial if a 
nationalist movement is to succeed. But, what are the implications of 
turning to the people? He points at three main implications: (1) speaking 
their language; (2) taking a more kind view of their general “culture” which 
had been relegated by the Enlightenment and (3) coming to terms with the 
enormous and still irreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life 
(Nairn 1977, p. 101). 
 
John Breuilly: The creators of ideology 
“Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern 
problem of the relationship between state and society”  
(Nationalism and the State, p. 349) 
 
Breuilly understands nationalism as a form of politics, principally 
opposition politics. In his view, “the term ‘nationalism’ is used to refer to 
political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such 
actions with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1982, p. 3).  
Breuilly, in line with Kedourie and Nairn, stresses the ability of 
nationalism to attain mass support and confers a pre-emin nt role to 
intellectuals and members of the professions as key figures in the 
construction of nationalist ideologies. But, according to him “nationalism 
cannot be seen as the politics of any particular social class...[and] neither 
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can it be regarded as the politics of intellectuals”, although most nationalist 
leaders are drawn from the professions (Breuilly 1982, p. 332). 
In his view, the idea that “nationalism should be seen primarily as 
the search for identity and power on the part of displaced intellectuals is a 
gross exaggeration, even if that is what it means to many intellectuals in 
nationalist movements” (Breuilly 1982, p. 332). Breuilly admits, however, 
that the exclusion from expected positions suffered by some intellectuals 
and members of the professions may contribute to their support for 
nationalism as an ideology able to provide a new identity containing 
“images of an ideal state and an ideal society” in which they will have a 
secure, respected and leading position (Breuilly 1982, p. 329). 
Breuilly points at two set of arguments to explain the intellectuals' 
attraction to nationalism. First, althoug  he portrays nationalist intellectuals 
as unsuccessful professionals, he argues that their failure is relative, since 
it involves both failing to obtain certain positions, and not getting the 
financial and social status expected from the position attained. Here the 
argument echoes that of Kedourie's theory about indigenous intellectuals 
being excluded from top positions in colonial societies and how this made 
them turn to nationalism. Second, he argues that the excessive number of 
intellectuals produced by some societies and the inability to “absorb” them, 
may also contribute to explain why some intellectuals turn to nationalism.  
He perceives nationalist politics as elite politics in politically fragile 
states, or as a form of politics which can arouse mass support without 
having to tie itself too closely to the specific concerns of that support. The 
compelling character of the nationalist ideology stems from the connection 
between the intellectuals' portray of the nation and the common beliefs and 
often widespread political grievances shared by large sectors of the 
population. 
He argues that symbols and ceremonies award nationalist ideas a 
definite shape and force in two major ways: they project certain images of 
the nation, and enable people to come togther expressing some type of 
national solidarity.  
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Anthony D. Smith: “In search of identity” 
“There is, in fact, an ‘elective affinity’ between the adapted model of a 
civic, territorial nation and the status, needs and interests of the 
professionals (and to a lesser extent of the commercial bourgeoisie)” 
(National Identity, p. 121) 
 
In his early work Smith confers pre-eminence to political and 
religious, rather than social and cultural factors in the emergence of what 
he refers to as ethnic nationalism. He argues that the modern era is 
characterized by the rise of what he calls the “scientific state”, this is, “a 
state whose efficacy depends on its ability to harness science and 
technology for collective purposes” (Smith 1998, p. 189). In his view, the 
emergence of the “scientific state” challenges the legitimacy of religious 
explanations and favours situations of “dual legitimation”, in which rival 
grounds of authority dispute for the allegiance of humanity. Intellectuals, as 
the equivalent of pre-modern priests, are particularly affected by this 
dispute.  
According to Smith, the rise of a secular intelligentsia within the 
framework of the “scientific state” has encountered several obstacles, 
among them: the overproduction of highly qualified personnel, the 
opposition on the part of entrenched hierarchical bureaucrats to the critical 
rationalism of the intelligentsia, and the use of ethnic or other cultural 
grounds for discrimination in admitting sections of the intelligentsia to 
public high-status positions.  
Smith emphasizes the crucial role of intellectuals as generators of 
ideology and leaders of the nationalist movement in its early stages, 
although he is more sceptical about their function once the nationalist 
movement develops. He rejects those who define intellectuals as fanatical 
power-seeking individuals, though he accepts that, in some instances, it is 
possible to point at some excluded and resentful intellectuals especially in 
colonial societies.  
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Smith concludes that the beneficiaries of nationalism re the 
members of the mobilized thnie at large, since nationalism favours both, 
the activation of the masses and the end of their role as passive objects of 
external domination, and the elevation of popular culture into literary “high” 
culture performed by intellectuals. Against those who stress the invented 
nature of nations and nationalism (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), Smith 
highlights the “ethnic origins” of most of the cultural elements selected by 
intellectuals in the construction of modern nationalism. 
To explain the attraction that many intellectuals in different parts of 
the world have felt for nationalism and their influential imprint on the 
ideology and language of nationalism, Smith invokes the “identity crisis” 
experienced by people in general and the intellectuals in particular 
stemming from the challenges posed to traditional religion and society by 
the “scientific state”. He argues that the “nationalist solution” allows 
individuals to draw their own identity from the collective identity of the 
nation. In so doing, “she or he becomes a citizen, which is, a recognized 
and rightful member of a political community that is, simultaneously a 
cultural ‘community of history and destiny’” (Smith 1991, p. 97). Here 
Smith stresses the relation between national identity and citizenship thus 
emphasizing the cultural and political aspects of nationalism.  
The writings of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith firmly place 
intellectuals as the generators of nationalism. In so doing, these scholars 
coincide in defining nationalism as a modern political ideology which, to be 
successful, requires the support of the masses, however, they regard the 
relationship between intellectuals and the masses in very different ways. 
Kedourie underlines the wide gap between intllectual elites and 
the masses. In contrast, Nairn accents the need to create an inter-class 
community united by a common objective and, Breuilly describes what we 
could refer to as an “interactive” relationship between intellectual elites and 
the masses. Smith  highlights the shared character of national identity 
among members of the same nation.  
Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the significance of 
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mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. They also 
emphasize the power of culture, language, symbols and ceremonials as 
key constituents of nationalism. What is lacking from their analysis is a 
specific theory considering whether the task of intellectuals in nations 
without states is different, and if so, to what extent, from the task of 
intellectuals in nation-states. Apart from Kedourie who studies the 
relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in colonial societies, 
neither Nairn, Breuilly or Smith specify the context within which the 
intellectuals they analyse live and develop their theories. 
There is considerable literature on the role of intellectuals in 
oppositional nationalisms, however, most of it concerns the study of 
underdeveloped countries (Hobsbawm, Gouldner, Kautsky). An exception 
to the considerable literature devot d to the study of nationalism and 
intellectuals in colonial societies  is exemplified by the work of Pinard and 
Hamilton who study the participation of intellectuals in Quebec nationalism 
(Pinard and Hamilton, 1984). But their work has a primarily empirical focus 
and fails to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship 
between intellectuals and nationalism in stateless nations. In what follows, 
I address this particular task.  
Part Three 
Intellectuals in nations without states: the case of 
Catalonia 
The third part of this paper offers a theoretical analysis of the 
socio-political context within which intellectuals operate in nations without 
states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in the 
maintenance of the Catalan language and culture during Franco's 
dictatorship (1939-1975). First, I offer a brief account of the cultural 
resistance activities carried out by Catalan intellectuals. Second, I analyse 
the processes that saw Catalan nationalism transformed from an elite into 
a mass movement. In conclusion, the paper examines a number of the 
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rational and emotional arguments that intellectuals invoke as they pursue 
their role as  mobilizing agents in contemporary Catalan nationalism. 
I am aware of the existence of substantial differences between the 
role of intellectuals at the birth and the re-emergence of a nationalist 
movement that has been dismantled. I am justified, I believe, in selecting 
the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's dictatorship 
because of its devastating effects on Catalan language and culture (Benet, 
1973). In that context, only small circles of intellectuals and clandestine 
political activists engaged in the maintenance of key components of 
Catalan identity and primarily devoted their efforts to the cultivation of 
Catalan high culture. To begin with, I turn to the issue of the discussion of 
the specific context within which intellectuals develop their activities in 
nations without states. 
The socio-political context 
I argue that the study of nationalism in nations without states 
requires a specific approach which should take into account two key 
factors. First, that sub-state nationalism emerges within already 
established nation-states and second, the need for an “alternative elite” 
ready to challenge the state, construct a nationalist ideology and lead the 
nationalist movement. 
(1) The nationalism of nations without states emerges within 
already established nation-states endowed with their own national 
education system, a specific media system, a constituted power elite and a 
set of institutions forming the state and defining its territorial, political, 
social and economic framework. Nation-states embody a cluster of 
institutions which both define and govern the country while stateless 
nations may or may not enjoy some kind of cultural or political autonomy, 
as a result of the state's decision.  
Often, more than one nation live under the umbrella of a single 
state. Almost invariably, one nation prevails above the others and plays a 
leading role in the governance of the country and also in defining its 
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identity through the promotion of a specific culture and language, which 
generally involves the marginalization of minority cultures and languages. 
In Spain, Castile turned to be the dominant ntion to the detriment of 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and other regions.  
The mere existence of a community which considers itself to be a 
nation other than the one the state seeks to promote poses a threat to and 
questions the legitimacy of thestate wherever it is defined as a unitary 
political institution. Democratic states recognize internal diversity, 
however, they are often reluctant to employ the term “nation” when 
referring to their national minorities since the political consequences which 
this may entail, for instance the recognition of a nation's right to self-
determination, are usually quite problematic. For this reason, the state 
tends to regard minority nationalisms as dangerous, or at least, as an 
uncomfortable phenomenon to deal with. 
The ways in which the state responds to the demands of the 
national minorities included within its territory depend upon the state's own 
nature, the specific character of the nationalist movement, and the 
international support this is able to secure. 
(2) The emergence of a nationalist movement in a nation without 
state requires the existence of some intellectuals prepared to build up a 
nationalist discourse different from, and often opposed to, that of the state.  
In contrast, intellectuals indigenous to the nation-state develop 
their work within already established frameworks created and supported by 
the state. As the nation-state was in the process of being created, 
intellectual discourse was structured by the culture and language employed 
in the homogenization of its citizenry and the simultaneous marginalization 
of regional languages and cultures. As a result, such intellectuals are often 
critical and even dismissive of regional nationalist movements. 
The “potential elite” 
Crucial to the development of nationalism in nations without states 
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is the existence and position occupied by the “potential elite”. By this I refer 
to those educated individuals who, if the nationalist movement succeeds, 
are likely to become its leaders. The potential elite includes: 
(a) Individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state's treatment of 
their community. The degree and strength of their dissatisfaction may vary. 
In some cases, it is connected to the intensity of the state's repressive and 
discriminatory measures which may range from cultural and socio-political 
measures to the use of force. Catalan intellectuals who engaged in 
resistance activities against Franco's regime are a case in point.  
(b) Individuals who have been excluded from the state's “official” 
elite because of their regional origin. In such cases, individuals are unable 
to develop their work within the state's circles of power and influence, and 
have to circumscribe their activities to their region. This could be 
exemplified by the widespread Castilian adverse attitude towards Catalans 
which lead to their exclusion from influential positions in the Spanish 
economic and political power structure during the nineteenth and most of 
the twentieth century.  
(c) Individuals who decide to prioritize their allegianc to the nation 
without state instead of aspiring to be integrated within the state's official 
elite. This involves their commitment to the advancement of a national 
cause opposed to that of the state, which often translates itself into their 
automatic exclusion from the state's selected elite. In these cases, it is the 
individual's choice rather than the state's systematic exclusion of some 
people because of their regional origin which leads to the inclusion of these 
individuals in the category of potential el te. In contemporary democratic 
Spain, the choice of some Catalan intellectuals to develop their work 
exclusively in Catalan automatically excludes them from Spanish speaking 
intellectual circles, unless their work is translated into Spanish. It has been 
argued that this is a strategy by means of which some educated people 
who would otherwise be unlikely to achieve a prominent position within the 
state's elite –because of fierce competition– would easily obtain a 
prominent position within a nation which is smaller and where competition 
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is bound to be less intense. This argument emphasizes the self-inter st of 
some individuals in promoting regional forms of nationalism in order to 
gain access to privileged positions.  
In my view, although self-interest may in some cases play a 
substantial part in explaining why some intellectuals support sub-state 
forms of nationalism, it is misleading to explain all nationalist allegiances 
through economic motivation and the desire for power. A genuine love for 
the nation and a desire for its flourishing inspires many nationalists in 
nations without states, especially in those cases where the nation feels 
culturally, politically or economically oppressed by the state. Devoting 
one's life to the defence and enhancement of the specific character of 
one's own nation may act as a potent force. It provides meaning to the 
individual's life whilst setting a concrete and clear-cut objective to his or 
her actions. Because individuals usually embark upon nationalist projects 
as part of a group, they are bound to experience some kind of moral 
support and solidarity as members of a movement with a common goal. 
The sense of belonging to a nation can somehow be lived through the 
experience of comradeship arising within the nationalist movement or 
party.  
In spite of this, differences amongst nationalist leaders are not to 
be ignored since fierce confrontation between them is a common 
phenomenon. Jealousy and competition amongst intellectuals are also 
commonplace. They struggle to become more influential, obtain more 
recognition or be offered a better job. 
Intellectuals and nationalism in Catalonia. 
Cultural resistance 
During Franco's regime, the Catalan intellectual elite was divided 
between those who supported Francoism and those who stood against it 
and took upon themselves the task of maintaining the vernacular language 
and culture. Yet, while some of the former were incorporated into 
mainstream Spanish elite, the latter were automatically excluded and often 
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persecuted by the regime. When considering the initiatives to preserve 
Catalan culture and language, which rose during that period we should 
distinguish between: initiatives rising from particular individuals and 
groups, and those emerging from some sectors of two powerful institutions: 
the Catholic Church and the University. 
Individual and collective initiatives 
The Institute for Catalan Studies (Institut d'Estudis Catalans), 
dismantled in 1939, was reorganized in 1942 by Josep Puig i Cadafalch 
and Ramon Aramon. Their clandestine activities involved the publication 
of books and articles on medicine, science and other subjects in Catalan. 
Omnium cultural, a semi-clandestine institution from 1964, was legally 
recognized in 1967 and then saw a dramatic increase in membership (from 
639 in 1968 to 11,000 in 1971). Among the activities of Omnium Cultural 
were the teaching of Catalan and the sponsoring of the Prize of Honour of 
the Catalan Letters (Premi d'honor de les lletres catalanes) (Vilar 1989, p. 
358). The organization of cultural clandestine groups such as Amics de la 
Poesia, Estudi or Miramar, together with the holding of Literary 
competitions such as the Nit de Santa Llúcia (St. Lucy's evening) and the 
Cantonigrós,  and the publication of journals in Catalan (Fabré, Huertas 
and Ribas 1978, pp. 156 ff), were some of the major activities organized 
by intellectual elites (Casassas, 1999). 
The Catholic Church 
Further to the activities of private individuals, the Catholic Church 
and the University contributed to sustain Catalan culture. The position of 
the Catalan Church was not homogeneous. Thus, while some sectors 
supported the Francoist regime, others were reluctant to adopt an attitude 
that could undermine the strong relationship between religion and Catalan 
culture sustained since the Middle Ages. Some sectors of the Catholic 
Church assumed a crucial role by preaching and teaching religion in 
Catalan and employing it as an instrument of culture and communication. 
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In 1942, the first book legally published in Catalan after the Civil War 
appeared. It was a religious book produced under the auspices of the 
Catholic Church.  
Amid other activities, the Abbey of Montserrat played a remarkable 
part in continuing to publish in Catalan. They created and promoted, 
among others, some children's publications (L'Infantil, Tretzevents) and 
some cultural and religious journals (Serra d'Or, Qüestions de vida 
cristiana). In 1958, the Abbey founded the Estela  Press to promote 
religious books in Catalan (Masot i Muntaner, 1986) and in 1971 the PAM 
Press (Publications of the Montserrat's Abbey) became official (Faulí 1999, 
p. 35-39). The Abbey was also active in providing shelter to intellectuals 
and clandestine political activists from a wide political spectrum.  
The University 
The official organization of student life centred around the 
University Students Union (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitarios or SEU) 
under the control of pro-regime individuals, however, constant resistance 
activities developed within the university. The University Front of Catalonia 
(Front Universitari de Catalunya or FUC) combined people from different 
backgrounds. It advocated the reconstruction of Catalonia and produced a 
critical account of pre-war Catalan politics.  
Other university organizations included the National Front of 
Catalonia (Front Nacional de Catalunya or FNC), and the National 
Federation of Students of Catalonia (Federació Nacional d'Estudiants de 
Catalunya or FNEC) which represented an attempt to unify efforts in 
fighting the SEU. The university movement received new strength in the 
mid and late 1950s when new associations emerged. Three major 
campaigns were launched by the students between 1960 and 1961: the 
demand for the creation of Catalan culture and language Departments; a 
campaign against the increasing influe ce of Opus Dei; and the demand of 
amnesty for political prisoners and those in exile.  
In the late sixties and early seventies, the influence of the 1968 
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student uprisings in France and the “Prague Spring” favoured the 
proliferation of radical organizations within the university, and nationalist 
claims came to be perceived as bourgeois. Nationalist groups disappeared 
from the university arena to return only after Franco's death. 
From elite into mass movement 
Three main phenomena marked the transition of Catalan 
nationalism from an elite into a mass movement, these are: the Nova 
Cançó, the Assembly of Catalonia and the proliferation of “solidarity 
actions”. 
The long years of repression endured by  Catalans resulted in a 
widening gap between intellectual elites and the masses and such a gap 
posed a serious threat to the survival of the Catalan language and culture. 
The Nova Cançó (New Folk Song) movement of the sixties played a key 
role in the regeneration of the public sphere in Catalonia. The movement 
was founded by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singers 
and soon developed into an entirely popular phenomenon. The more 
Catalan singers were banned from the media and their concerts prohibited, 
the more popular they became. The Nova Cançó contributed to “give 
people –especially young people– all over the Paï sos Catalans, or 
Catalan-speaking territories, a sense of community till then never felt nor 
expressed so intensely” (Giner 1998, p. 71-76). 
The Assembly of Catalonia (Assemblea de Catalunya, 1971) 
brought together three hundred people from diverse social backgrounds 
and political allegiances. It was the most important clandestine unitary 
movement in Catalonia since the Civil War and had no equivalent in any 
other part of Spain. The Assembly presented a common platform based 
upon four demands: (1) a general amnesty for political prisoners and 
exiles; (2) the upholding of human rights; (3) the provisional re-
establishment of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and; (4) the co-
ordination of all peninsular peoples in fighting for democracy (Batista and 
Playà Maset 1991, pp. 301-302). The Assembly continued its unitary 
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mobilizing activities until the first Spanish democratic elections (15 June 
1977). From that moment onwards, the recently legalized political parties 
took over leadership and concentrated on emphasizing difference between 
them in order to obtain good results in regional and national elections. 
Intellectual unity was definitely broken and differing nationalist discourses 
emerged. 
While remaining a dictatorship wedded to conservative ideology, 
the Francoist regime went through different stages as a number of its 
policies were certainly modified over time. These modifications were a 
response to pressures to become more acceptable to Western 
democracies and were reinforced by deepening technocratic influences 
upon the regime during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In addition, free 
market ideals fundamentally transformed the structure of the Spanish 
economy with unintended consequences on Spanish society and social 
structure. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the resistance movement took 
advantage of all possible breaches to actively protest against the regime. 
For instance, the early 1970s saw an increase in the number of “solidarity 
actions”. By “solidarity action” I mean an action that is usually instilled by a 
small elite but whose aim is to attain mass mobilization. The objective of a 
“solidarity action” is to show the opposition's strength by focusing upon a 
particular demand and presenting it as undeniable due to the massive 
support it receives (Guibernau 1996, p. 105). A “solidarity action” which 
exemplifies the moment in which Catalan nationalism had definitely shifted 
from an elite into a mass movement concerns the one million strong mass 
demonstration in Barcelona on 11 September 1977 demanding a statute of 
autonomy for Catalonia. Franco had died in 1975 and the Political Reform 
Programme presented by the then Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, had 
been ratified by an overwhelming majority. In spite of that, the status that 
Catalonia might achieve within the new democratic Spanish state had not 
been decided yet. The Constitution that would define Spain as a 
democratic state and confer autonomy to Catalonia was to be ratified in 
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1978. 
Rational and emotional arguments as mobilizing agents 
Rational and emotional arguments become intertwined when 
intellectuals seek to awaken the nation and generate a mass nationalist 
movement. Rationality stems from the objective reasons invoked by 
nationalists when defending their case. Independence or greater autonomy 
may mean: a better economy by encouraging regional development and 
the right to retain regionally generated wealth; a higher quality of life; 
freedom from a series of constraints imposed by the state and; even a 
deepening of democracy by favouring decentralization and self-
determination.  
Emotions are aroused when the nation is presented as a 
community which transcends the limited lives of particular individuals while 
providing them with a collective sense of identity. Belonging to a nation, 
which is real in the minds of its members, confers them a sense of 
continuity grounded upon the sentiment of being part of a group portrayed 
as an extended family. Individuals are born into particular families in the 
same way as they are placed within specific nations which act as major 
socializing agents. Individuals are brought up within particular cultures 
which define the way in which they relate to themselves, others and nature. 
The use of a particular language increases the sentiment of belonging to a 
community sharing a common history and a common set of values and 
practices. As in a family, membership of the nation implies a certain 
solidarity, in this case, with fellow nationals. It also demands sacrifices nd 
generates sentiments of love and affection which generally become more 
prominent when the well being of the group in under threat. 
Rational arguments in contemporary Catalan nationalism  
Rational and emotional arguments have a strong presence in 
Catalan nationalism which is currently split between a majority movement 
for greater political autonomy within Spain, and a minority movement for 
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Catalan independence. During Franco's regime, the key objective was to 
restore democracy and with it the right of Catalonia to develop its language 
and culture, and recover its autonomous political institutions. These were 
rational demands capable of arousing intense emotional reactions. 
In this section I examine some of the arguments which are 
currently being invoked by Catalan nationalists, including intellectuals as 
well as political leaders, to legitimize their demands for further autonomy 
for Catalonia some twenty years after the restoration of its autonomous 
government (Generalitat). In their view, Catalonia should enjoy increasing 
levels of self-government, be granted a fiscal regime balancing out 
regional inequalities and be recognized as a nation within Spain with the 
means to develop fully its distinct identity. Certain Catalan nationalists 
argue that only through independence can Catalonia thrive culturally and 
economically and thereby find itself considered a fully fledged political 
actor in the international arena.  
I distinguish three main rational arguments destined to convince 
not only those who share a strong sense of national identity but also those 
who are solely interested in supporting Catalan nationalism in so far as it 
proves capable of improving their quality of life, deepening democracy 
and/or dynamising civil society.  
First, the argument that Catalonia's contribution to the Spanish 
coffers heavily outweighs the income it receives from the central 
government. This is presented as an unjust situation which, if reversed, 
would automatically increase the Generalitat's spending power  and 
improve the Cat lans' quality of life. 
Second, the argument that political decentralization tends to 
strengthen democracy in as much as it brings decision-maki g processes 
closer to the people. Problems are identified, analysed and resolved where 
they emerge. Regional politicians usually have greater awareness of the 
needs and aspirations of their electorates, thus the argument follows, 
greater devolved powers for Catalonia would strengthen Spanish 
democracy and encourage greater democratic participation within the 
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region. 
Third, the devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the 
re-allocation of resources to facilitate discrete policies and regional budget 
planning. These processes, in turn, contribute to revitalize civil society, 
encouraging local and regional initiatives which include cultural, economic 
and social projects. The demand for greater autonomy is connected with 
the wish to increase Catalonia's ability and efficiency to govern itself and 
be recognized as a distinct political actor within the European Union and 
other international institutions.  
Emotional arguments in contemporary Catalan nationalism 
In Catalan nationalism, emotional arguments emphasize the 
sentiment of belonging to a cultural and territorial community which has 
suffered and rejoiced together throughout time. Emotional arguments 
evolve around three major clusters: history, territory and art.
First, a considerable number of people who suffered under 
Francoism still hold live images of either their own or their loved one's 
experiences which may include: torture, imprisonment, exile, proscription, 
and lack of freedom to cultivate their vernacular language and culture. 
Memories of oppression under Franco are connected with a long list of 
grievances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to 
eradicate Catalan language, culture and political institutions. Key historical 
events, invested with particular meaning and capable of arousing an 
emotional response when Catalans “tell their history” include: The Revolt 
of the Reapers (Revolta dels Segadors) in 1640, when Catalans united 
against the harsh treatment they were receiving from Castile (Elliott, 1963) 
and, the abolition of Catalan rights and liberties in 1714 when on 11 
September (turned into Catalonia's national day), after amassive Franco-
Spanish attack, Barcelona surrendered. Philip V (Felipe V) ordered the 
dissolution of Catalan political institutions and Catalonia was subject to a 
regime of occupation; its language was forbidden and Castilian (Spanish) 
was proclaimed official (Balcells 1996, p. 12- 7). More recent historical 
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memories include the suppression of the administrative government of the 
Catalan Mancomunitat (1913- 923) after the coup d'état  of Miguel Primo 
de Rivera. 
Second, references to the territory of Catalonia are contested. A 
substantial number of people refers to the so called Paï sos Catalans 
(Catalan Countries) including Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and 
territories across the Pyrenees on the French side of the border. They 
justify their claim by stressing that these territories which, in medieval 
times were included in the dominion of the Count of Barcelona, share a 
common linguistic and cultural background. Dialects of Catalan are 
currently spoken in Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the area around 
Perpignan (France). 
Particular landscapes are emotionally charged and portrayed as 
embodying Catalan traditions, history and culture. The monasteries of 
Ripoll, Montserrat and Cuixà (France); mountains such as the Canigó 
(France), or urban landscapes such as the Fossar de les Moreres 
(Barcelona) are among them. 
Third, selected works of art and artists turned into symbols of 
Catalan identity are often portrayed as part of a corpus of Catalan high 
culture which has received international recognition. The work of Joan 
Miró, Salvador Dalí, Antoni Gaudí, Antoni Tàpies and Pau Casals, among 
others, stands side by side with fine examples of Romanesque (Taüll) and 
Gothic art (Barcelona's gothic area). The rich Catalan folklore including the 
sardana (Catalan national dance) should be added to the list of symbols of 
Catalan identity.  
A further and powerful symbol of Catalan identity which somehow 
escapes the above typology concerns sport, football in particular. During 
Francoism, the Barcelona Football Club (Barça) was portrayed as a 
representative of the Catalan nation and exemplified resistance against the 
dictatorship. In Catalonia, the Barça's victories were celebrated as Catalan 
victories and whenever Barcelona F. C. and Real Madrid played each 
other the significance of the match went well beyond sport. Emotions were 
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and are still aroused at the Nou Camp (Barça's stadium). At present, 
Catalan nationalists have launched a campaign demanding the central 
government the right for Catalonia to create its own Catalan Football Team 
able to compete in international contests. This movement has galvanized a 
very large section of the population and is putting pressure on Madrid to 
reverse its initial negative response. 
The way in which people identify with and relate to history, territory 
and art as part of a common shared heritage which contributes to define 
the community they belong to is not homogeneous. It is important to 
emphasize that symbols are effective because they are imprecise. 
Symbols transform difference into the appearance of similarity, thus 
allowing people to invest the “community” with ideological integrity. This, in 
my view, accounts for the ability of nationalism to bind together people 
from different cultural levels and social backgrounds.  
The power of emotional arguments stems from their capacity to 
appeal to individuals who share the same culture, feel attached to a 
concrete land, have the experience of a common past and a project for the 
future. Intellectuals and political leaders (in some cases religious leaders 
should also be included) select and promote the key elements which 
conform national identity, and they also re-create and generate occasions 
in which all that unites those belonging to the nation is emphasized. In 
these moments, individuals forget about themselves, and the sentiment of 
belonging to the group occupies the prime position. The collective life of 
the community stands above that of the individual. Through symbolism 
and ritual, individuals are able to feel an emotion of unusual i tensity that 
springs from their identification with an entity –the nation– which 
transcends them, and of which they actively feel a part.  
Concluding remarks 
Intellectuals play a double role. On the one hand, they act as 
architects of the nationalist movement by providing cultural, historical, 
political and economic arguments to sustain the distinctive character of the 
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nation and to legitimize its will to decide upon its political future.  
On the other hand, as we have already mentioned, intellectuals 
are subversive and construct a discourse which undermines the legitimacy 
of the current order of things. They denounce the nation's present situation 
within the state and offer an alternative to it by promoting the conditions 
and processes of conflict. Intellectuals are to be considered as formulators 
of the nationalist ideology, however, their task does not end here, since 
many of them do also act as agitators and mobilizers of the nationalist 
movement. Valentí Almirall, (1841-1904), Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-
1917), Jordi Pujol (1930), represent but a few examples of key ideologists 
of Catalan nationalism who have turned into extremely influential political 
leaders.  
I have argued that two main factors define the socio-polit cal 
context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. First, 
sub-state nationalism emerges within already established nation-st tes 
with their own elites, culture, education and media systems and 
international recognition as political institutions. Second, to be successful, 
sub-state nationalism requires the existence of an alternative elite able to 
construct a discourse critical of the current status quo, and ready to 
formulate an alternative nationalist ideology. 
Let me attempt, in conclusion, a summary of the themes of thi
paper.  
(a) A combination of factors explain why intellectuals turn to 
nationalism in nations without states. Against those who, like Kedourie, 
insist that intellectuals turn to nationalism for mere self-inter st, I agree 
with Breuilly that, although this may sometimes be the case, such an 
assertion represents a gross exaggeration.  
Altruism and the genuine desire for freedom for one's own country 
often account for the intellectuals' fascination with nationalism. For 
instance, in the early stages of a nationalist movement, a certain degree of 
altruism and love of country act as potent forces informing the intellectuals' 
actions. These sentiments are bound to emerge with even greater intensity 
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wherever, as the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's 
regime shows, a national minority lives under repression. In such 
circumstances, endorsing the minority's nationalism often involves not only 
the radical exclusion from the states' elite, but a considerable risk to one's 
own life.  
The question why some Catalan intellectuals continue to support 
nationalism within contemporary democratic Spain would require a more 
complex analysis far beyond the scope of this paper, however, some hints 
about this particular issue could be gathered by considering th  emotional 
and rational arguments they employ as mobilizing agents that we have 
already analysed. 
(b) Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the great 
relevance of mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. During 
Francoism, the greatest threat to the survival of the core components of 
Catalan identity was the widening gap between an intellectual elite 
cultivating Catalan high culture and the mass of the population more 
vulnerable to the homogenizing policies of Franco's regime. In additio  to 
this, the large number of Castilian-speaking immigrants from other parts of 
Spain, favoured by the state and combined with an absolute lack of 
political instruments and Catalan institutions to deal with it, contributed to 
the weakening of a then proscribed Catalan language and culture. 
Catalonia received 1,400,000 Castilian-speaking immigrants between 1950 
and 1975, during that period Catalonia's total population shifted from 
3,240,313 to 5,663,125. 
Catalan intellectuals and clandestine political leaders, aware of the 
need to turn nationalism into a mass movement, emphasized the need to 
create an inter-class community including all members of Catalan society 
and united around a common objective: to oppose Franco's dictatorship. 
They fought for the freedom associated with the restoration of democracy 
and the preservation of Catalan identity. Once democracy was restored, 
the relationship between intellectuals and the masses became crucially 
influenced by the appropriation of Catalan nationalism made by the now 
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legalized political parties.  
 
 
Notes 
 
 The research upon which this paper is based is a part of the “Regional 
identity and European citizenship” project funded by the ESRC programme 
“One Europe or Several?” 
 
1. See also: Hodgkin, 1964; Trevor-Roper, 1962; Kohn, 1944. 
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